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ABSTRACT
SPECIALIZED HOUSEHOLDS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACTS OF
AGRARIAN CHANGE ON CHINESE PEASANT WOMEN
by
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on May 19, 1989 in partial fulfillment of
the requirements of the Degree of
Master of City Planning
In this study, we caution against the use of achievements of
"specialized households" in rural China as a sole indication
of the success of current rural reforms without
differentiating there impacts on peasants living within the
specialized household. We propose that in order to
understand how current rural reforms are working, we should
study the organization of work, mobilization of family
laborers, and allocation of labor products within the
household. By "decomposing" the household, we can gain
important insights into how work is organized and how rural
reforms affect the livelihood of women, men, elders, and
children within and beyond the specialized household.
To support our idea, we concentrate our study on the impacts
of rural reforms on peasant women in specialized households.
Based on some secondary information, we find that female
laborers are playing a more important role in the current
household production system. Having to assume greater
responsibility in agricultural production, peasant women
have to deal with the dual roles of being good workers and
mothers/wives at the same time. Accordingly, their work
burden increases.
Moreover, we hypothesize four possible means in which female
laborers are mobilized and controlled within the household.
We also propose several research questions for future
analysis of the dynamics of agrarian change in China.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Karen R. Polenske
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The Chinese rural economy is in the midst of rapid
economic change. One of the most important dimensions of
the recent reforms has been the reestablishment of the
peasant household as the basic economic and social unit.
Indeed, the peasant household has virtually replaced the
collective as the dominant unit of production in rural China
(Zhou and Du, 1986). With the increase of importance of the
peasant household, Chinese scholars and officials are
focusing their attention on a specific type of households
called "specialized households."i Specialized households
have been able to raise their productivity and household
income under the rural reforms, and the Chinese government
has publicized their achievements to show the success of the
government policy towards development in rural sectors.
The primary goal in this study is show why the use of
achievements of specialized household is a poor indication
of the success of current rural reform. Knowing the impacts
of reforms on a specialized household may not give us any
clear knowledge concerning changes in the livelihood of
people living within it. We suggest that if we "decompose"
I Specialized households are a specific type of rural
households that concentrate their labor in specialized
agricultural or nonagricultural production. In Appendix A,
we give a more detailed definition and description of
specialized households and identify some differences between
specialized households and other nonspecialized households.
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the specialized household, we can gain important insight
into how work is organized, how resources are allocated, and
how labor products are distributed within the household. By
"looking inside" the household, we can then understand the
impacts of the rural reforms on peasants, namely women, men,
elders, and children. Knowing this will, in turn, help us
to determine whether the rural reforms are able to enhance
the welfare of peasants in China.
In order to make the study manageable, we will focus
on the impacts of rural reforms on female laborers in
specialized households. Our principal research question is:
To what extent and in what manner does the development of
specialized households affect women in those households in
agricultural sectors of rural China? We will show that by
looking inside the specialized household and by
incorporating gender into our analytical framework, we can
obtain an improved understanding of the current agrarian
changes in China. We will show that this understanding may
have important policy implications for future rural reforms
and the welfare of Chinese peasant women in the new peasant
household economy.
Before we specify our major argument and methods of
conducting our research, we will discuss briefly the
government's view on how rural reforms have affected peasant
women. This discussion will explain why we feel that a
study of women's position in the new peasant household
-3-
economy is important.
Women in Peasant Household Economy: A Government Assessment
To the government, the increase of the income of the
"peasant household" will mean a general increase in the
standards of living for all household members. At a
national conference on rural work, Wan Li (1984, p. 16),
Vice-Premier of the State Council, stated that the emergence
of the household production system has improved the living
standards of peasants in general. He does not, however,
differentiate the impacts of reforms on women, men, elders,
and children.
Lou Qiong (1986, p. 167), longtime leader of the All-
China Democratic Women's Federation (Women Federation)2 ,
argues that when the income of households increase,
households will be able to purchase durable consumer goods,
such as washing machines and electric irons. Lou argues
that these consumer goods can lessen the burden of women on
household chores; therefore, the increase in household
income will improve the well-being of peasant women.
According to Robinson (1985, p.45), peasants usually
reinvest household income in seed, livestock, fertilizers,
and agricultural supplies, because male heads of households
believe that it is more important to increase economic
2 All-China Democratic Women's Federation is the most
recognized government body in dealing with women's issues.
Its major function is to publicize and carry out the Party's
political direction and campaigns.
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returns than to lessen women's burden from onerous household
tasks. Accordingly, the increase in household income does
not necessarily benefit women unless they are able to decide
how income is to be spent in the household.
Apparently, Chinese government officials and some
women leaders believe that labor products are evenly
distributed between household members, and there is no
conflict of interests within the household on how income
should be spent. We believe, however, that gender relations
within the household are so important to our understanding
of agrarian change in China that we should study it
carefully rather than assume a harmonious situation inside
the household. When Streeten (1979, p. 31) argues against
the approach of poverty alleviation by raising the income of
the household, he raises the question of intra-household
distribution of goods and services. Based on a survey, he
states that the increase in the income of heads of
households does not necessary benefit women and children in
households. Besides, in the existing agricultural household
models, scholars do not deny the fact that a conflict of
interests exists within the household, and power relations
between household members are the major determinant for
income or welfare distribution within the household. We
will discuss these household models briefly later in this
chapter.
Some Chinese officials also recognize the seriousness
- 5 -
of internal conflicts within the household. A survey
conducted by a reporter of People's Daily (1982, p. 3) on 15
collectives in Guangzu province shows that 241 people
committed suicide because of conflicts with their household
members, and 66 percent of the victims were women.
Treating the household as a unitary whole has two
important policy implications. First, planners and scholars
will judge the well-being of members within the household
based on the income or the standard of living of the
"household" without differentiating the impacts of rural
reforms on individual members; therefore, the economic and
social impacts of reforms on women, men, elders, and
children will be buried under the glorified success of
peasant households. We will argue that this approach will
not lead us too far in understanding the effects on the
livelihood of peasants under this drastic institutional
change in rural China.
If government officials think that the rural reforms
have increased the well-being of peasants, they will neglect
the fact that the institutional changes that were brought
forth by reforms have transformed the way that needy people
get access to welfare services. This change will demand a
new role of the government in providing welfare services to
some peasants who are not able to increase their well-being
in the new production system. While collectives are playing
less active roles in the new peasant household economy, the
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government is beginning to favor the notion of "self-help"
or "community care" programs that require a certain degree
of voluntarism from peasants rather than a formal government
involvement (Croll, 1988, p. 85). At the present time,
peasant households resume the responsibilities of the
welfare for their household members. The welfare of
individuals once again depend on household resources.
It is clear that the government is concerned about
the level of welfare that needy people received once
collectives started to play a less important role in the
rural communities. Government officials have conducted a
national survey of households that rely on the "five
guarantees" (wubao) (Croll, 1988, p. 85). The five
guarantees are benefits that collectives guaranteed their
childless members in their old ages; these benefits include
food, clothing, housing, medicine, and burial expenses
(Wolf, 1985, p. 196). After the survey, the government has
directed collectives to continue to provide necessary
assistance to these households; however, collective funds
are no longer sufficient to meet this obligation because
farmers retain most of the production surplus under the new
production system (Croll, 1988, p. 85). In addition, Davin
(1988, p. 144) reports that schools, kindergartens, and
clinics are being closed in some of the poorest regions in
China, because collective funds are not available.
Obviously, there is an urgent need for the government to
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reassess how reforms have affected the welfare of the needy
people but not to assume that every peasant is better off
under the new agricultural development policy.
Second, government officials and planners in China
believe that the "household" as a unit of production will
allocate their labor resources based on the supply and
demand of the "market." As Wan Li (1984, p. 20) argues,
with the reestablishment of rural commodity markets,
households can now allocate their household labor and
resources based upon the "value" of products, and this will
promote a more efficient use of scarce resources in the
rural sectors. Based on the assertion that the market can
allocate resources efficiently, Wan Li argues that China
should promote commodity production in the rural economy and
rely on the "regulating role of the market" to direct these
production. Many Chinese scholars, such as Feng (1983), Wei
(1983), and planners in the Department of Policy Study of
Shaanxi province (1983), propose that the government should
reduce centralized management on agricultural production and
control on labor and resource allocation in rural sectors.
Under this condition, answers to questions of how household
labor is mobilized and controlled will rely on the "market
mechanism" that may not be developed fully in rural China at
its current stage of development. We suggest that the
proper way to understand how labor is mobilized in current
Chinese rural economy is to analyze the power relations
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within and beyond the peasant household. Based on this
idea, we propose an alternative approach to evaluate the
Chinese rural reforms.
Decomposing the Specialized Household: An Alternative
Approach
The major objective of this thesis is to point out
the inadequacy of using the "specialized household" as a
unit of analysis for the success of current rural reforms.
Chinese scholars and planners argue that the development of
specialized households indicates a step forward for the
success of the current rural reform. They all believe that
the prosperity of these households is mainly because they
can adopt their production strategies to the reestablished
commodity markets in the rural economy (Wan, 1984; Zhang, et
al., 1983).
We, however, propose that new insights into the
production of specialized household will emerge if we
analyze the new institutional mechanism and power relations
by which family labor is mobilized and controlled within and
beyond the household. Instead of treating the specialized
household as a unitary whole that designs its production
based upon the "price signal" of the competitive market, we
will look at how the appropriation of family labor within
the household may affect and limit the success of
specialized households in the new peasant household economy.
We also suggest that without disaggregating the
- 9 -
household, Chinese planners will never be able to identify
the equity issues of how labor products are distributed and
how labor is mobilized within the household. If we unfold
the internal dynamics of specialized households, we will
find that female laborers in these households are the major
contributors to the increase in household productivity and
income. Not only can the skill of peasant women on sideline
production accommodate the governmental agricultural
development strategies, female laborers can also be
mobilized and controlled with ease and at minimal cost
because of the subordinated position of females in the male-
dominated rural society.
Having to assume greater responsibility in
agricultural production, peasant women have to deal with the
dual roles of being good workers and mothers/wives at the
same time. This bifurcated view of women's roles in
production and reproduction has intensified the burden on
female labor, and males are reluctant to share the
responsibilities of domestic chores in the household. In
other words, although the income level of specialized
households has increased, this success may be at the expense
of the general welfare of peasant women in the countryside
of China. Without changing the gender relations in the
rural area, the twin goals of the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) to achieve agricultural development and simultaneously




In order to support our argument, we develop a
framework that we use to study women's position in the
specialized household. One important element in our
framework is that we do not treat the specialized household
as a "black box"; instead we look inside the household and
analyze the impacts of rural reforms on female household
members. We argue that the most useful way to understand
the changing position of female household members in the
specialized household is to analyze three aspects of its
operation: (1) distribution of labor products; (2)
mobilization and allocation of family labor; and (3) control
of decisionmaking power in the household (Hart, 1988, p. 7).
We believe that it is the power relations between
genders and generations in the specialized household that
determine the sexual division of labor and organization of
production in the household. These power relations are
defined and limited by a set of implicit and explicit social
arrangements--rules, rights, and obligations in the family,
marriage, and society (Hart, 1988). These arrangement are
constantly modified and redefined by continuous bargaining
and negotiation between household members under changing
political and economic conditions of the larger economy
(Hart, 1988; Guyer and Peters, 1987; White, 1980). In order
to understand the formations of these social arrangements
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that constitute the male-dominated position in controlling
female labor and allocation of labor products, we will have
to analyze the bargaining position of women in the
specialized household in relation to the larger political
and economic structures of rural communities.
In order to analyze the bargaining position of women
in the specialized households, we will have to deal with the
following questions:
o What were the social arrangements that
determined the remuneration, mobilization, and
control of female laborers under the commune
system?
o How is labor mobilized within and beyond the
specialized households in the new peasant
household economy?
o What are the employment opportunities outside
the household for different household members?
o What are the mechanisms of income distribution
and control within specialized households?
o What property rights do different members of the
household have? How does control of household
assets affect the bargaining positions of
household members?
o How does the control of household income,
assets, and labor products relate to social and
political relations within and beyond a rural
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community?
o How does the shifting of the commune system to
the household production system affect these
social and political relations?
o Most importantly, how will our findings help us
to understand the dynamics of agrarian change in
China? What are the policy implications of
agrarian change on the welfare of the Chinese
peasant women?
We will try to answer these questions so as to capture and
understand the dialectical process of Chinese agrarian
change and their impacts on the livelihood of the Chinese
peasant women.
We derived the above-mentioned analytical framework
from a series of studies on agricultural households. We
will review briefly some of these studies here. Although
agricultural households in rural China have just moved onto
the center stage of policy analysis, many analysts have
studied agricultural households in other parts of the world.
They include, just to name a few, Evenson (1976), Folbre
(1984), Gallin (1984), Hart (1988), Jones (1986), Sen
(1983), and Singh, et al. (1986).
The most widely-used theory of labor-power
allocation in peasant household economy is "Chayanov's
utilitarianism." According to Chayanov, the peasant
household is a self-contained unit of production and
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consumption, and it will allocate its labor-power according
to a set of preferences for consumption to leisure
(Harrison, 1975). Neoclassical economists such as Evenson
(1976) and Singh, et al. (1986) develop Chayanov's
utilitarianism further and argue that a peasant household
that tries to maximize the joint utility function of members
in the household will allocate its labor-power and resources
based upon the price signals in a perfect competitive
market.
Criticisms of this neoclassical approach come from
two fronts. First, several scholars have criticized the
assumption of the household joint utility function. Sen
(1983) argues that the consumption and production behavior
within the household is determined by negotiation and
contract-making instead of market prices. Folbre (1986,
p.249) points out the implicit assumption of the
neoclassical economists that changes of economic behavior
are attributed solely to changes in prices and incomes.
Both of them have suggested that analyzing the bargaining
power between members in the household is a more useful way
to understand resources allocation in peasant household
economy (Sen, 1983, p. 374; Folbre, 1986, p. 250).
The second attack on the neoclassical household model
is mainly related to its use of the "household" as a unit of
analysis. White (1980, p. 3) argues from an anthropological
perspective that the household cannot be treated as a unit
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that possesses unique characteristics of behavior. He
suggests that the most useful way to study household
behavior is to analyze the domestic arrangements through
which labor is controlled and organized and to relate these
arrangements as causes and consequences to the larger social
structure (White, 1980, p.7).
Guyer and Peters (1987, p. 210) caution against the
use of the "household" a unit of analysis, and they suggest
that the household should be recognized as having variable
and segmented structures. The household is variable because
it is both the outcome and channel of the changing process
of society. The household is segmented because it is
stratified and divided according to genders, age, clan, and
ethnicity.
In her articles, Hart (1988) shows from the Muda case
in Malaysia that the understanding of "the structure and
exercise of power at different levels of society" will shed
light on the dynamics of agrarian change. Instead of
treating the household as a unit of production, she analyzes
the connections and interactions between systems of class
and gender inequality and illustrates how these power
relations define the labor arrangement both within and
beyond the households in the Muda region. More importantly,
she shows the "mechanism" of how the larger political and
economic structures define the bargaining rules between
genders and classes and how struggles over the definition of
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these rules, in turn, shape the process of agrarian change.
In our study, we will apply this emerging framework
to study how peasant women in specialized households are
affected by the rural reforms in China. Not only may this
framework help us to understand how the rural reforms are
working, we can also test the applicability of this
methodology by studying agrarian change in a context of a
socialist country.
Study Design
Following are the issues that we have established in
the previous section and which we will discuss in this
thesis. First, we indicate some of the important aspects of
how female laborers are mobilized and controlled under the
commune system. In Chapter 2, we describe the organization
of labor under the commune system. We show how labor was
rewarded and how women fought against the unequal
remuneration system. Besides, we state how women's
subordination is connected to the power relations between
the State, the production team, and male and female workers
in the collective. This discussion will help us to compare
the way in which female laborers are mobilized in
specialized households.
Second, we show how labor is mobilized within the
specialized household in the new peasant household economy.
Based on information from case studies of 25 specialized
households, we study the allocation of female labor in these
- 16 -
households. In Chapter 3, we show that female laborers are
playing important roles in household production and
reproduction, and that the work burden on female laborers
has also been intensified.
Next, we discuss employment opportunities for
household members outside households and mechanisms of how
household income and assets are controlled. These studies
are critical to our understanding of the bargaining position
of members within specialized households. We, however, do
not have firm empirical evidence that is related directly to
specialized households; rather, we develop several
hypotheses based upon some indirect evidence that we infer
from the existing literature. These hypotheses are:
o The reason why men can control the income of
households is that they are able to control
functions of household production involving more
interactions within and beyond the village.
o Young women who have better employment
opportunities have stronger bargaining power
against males' domination than married and older
women.
o The subordinated position of peasant women is,
in part, because of their inability to possess
any property in the rural community.
o The inconsistency of government policies towards
women's issues has perpetuated gender inequality
- 17 -
in the rural area.
We will discuss each of these hypotheses in detail in
Chapter 4. The most appropriate way to test these
hypotheses is to examine them in a village with specific
social and economic settings. To do this, we would have to
interview specialized households and understand the domestic
arrangements within and beyond these households that are
used as means to control household income and assets.
Similarly, the last three questions that are related
to the relationship of bargaining position of household
members to the social and political structures within and
beyond the village also require field research. Through
field research, we can trace some of the relationships
between the operation of specialized households and the
larger economy by collecting "life histories" of women and
men in the village. These life histories will help us to
understand how changes in the livelihood of peasants evolve
under the rural reforms.
At this moment, without field research, our main goal
is to open up the question of the intra- and inter-household
dynamics rather than reach any absolute conclusions. We
will, therefore, treat this study as a part of a larger
investigation of agrarian change in rural China and propose
research questions for the future at the end of this thesis.
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Chapter 2
PEASANT WOMEN UNDER THE COMMUNE SYSTEM
As the focus of our study is to understand the effects
of agrarian change on peasant women in China, we must show
how female labor was mobilized and controlled before the new
peasant household economy. In this chapter, we discuss the
women's position under the commune system.
Under the commune system, the organization of labor
(both women and men) was largely determined by the team and
brigade leaders. The collective structure with three tiers
of management--the commune, production brigade, and
production team--had encapsulated peasants into one
institutional framework transmitting the economic control
and political authority from the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) to the daily lives of peasants. The peasant household
that used to be the major economic and social unit had
little independence in terms of decision on production and
mobilization of domestic labor.
The tight incorporation of peasant households into the
larger political and economic structure had defined and
limited the "rules" for negotiations on and struggles for
the control of labor products and allocation of labor-power
in the rural economy. Conflicts of interest between male
and female workers over remuneration and production process
are mainly played out at the commune level.
- 19 -
Mobilization of Female Labor
Under the traditional subsistence farming system,
women workers were under the control of heads of households
(usually the senior male), household heads would assign jobs
to female laborer, usually sidelines and domestic chores,
because these tasks were perceived as suitable for them in
the household. The control of female labor focused on the
household level with the government policies reinforcing the
male-dominated role in the rural communities. The kinship
system, patriarchy, inheritance laws, and other social
arrangements that confined women to a lower social status
had been explicitly or implicitly accepted by the State as
"customary practice," and this, in turn, placed women in a
weaker bargaining position than men (Cohen, 1988).
Under the commune system, however, the sexual division
of labor took a different form. Masses of female workers
entered into production outside their homes. This increase
in female's participation in production was based on two
reasons. First, the CCP had promised to promote gender
equality during its campaign before the Liberation. The CCP
thought that all people should be free from all kind of
subordinations in the "New China." For the poor peasants,
they should be free from class domination; for women, they
should rebel against the domination of male (Andors, 1983).
Because the CCP believed (and still does) that the only way
to liberate women was to increase women's participation in
- 20 -
the labor force, masses of female laborers were mobilized
and drawn into production.
Second, because of the larger water conservancy
projects and establishment of manufacturing sectors in
communes, labor, once perceived as an abundant resource,
quickly became scarce in agricultural sectors. As a result,
the labor-power of women was a major target for recruitment
in agricultural production. In 1955, Mao pointed out the
necessity of women participating in production. In his
speech "The Upsurge of Socialism in the Countryside," Mao
said (Andors, 1983, pg. 49):
In the case of many localities where production scope
has expanded ....... labor force will become
insufficient. This situation is only beginning and
will develop year after year in the future.... Women of
China constitute a great source of [labor]power. This
source must be tapped.
In the Great Leap, when collectivization reached its climax,
the mobilization of the female labor force involved 300
million women (Andors, 1983, p. 49). This large increase in
women's participation in the labor force had, in turn,
modified the power relations between genders in the
countryside.
For the first time, women were to work side-by-side
with other male workers in the fields. Women were assigned
work that was formerly done by men, and they were trained in
male skills and performed them with ease (Wolf, 1985, p.
23). This new opportunity for women had challenged the idea
- 21 -
of male supremacy in rural areas, and it also made women
realize the value of their labor outside their homes.
In order to allow more women to enter production, the
CCP took a big step to "socialize" the household work.
Communes transformed most of the domestic housework into
socially run large-scale undertakings. In communes, there
are dining halls where families can take their meals and
nurseries and kindergartens where workers' children are
cared for when their parents were working in the fields.
Commune tailoring workshops also made clothes and shoes for
workers and their families (Andors, 1983, p.51).
The establishment of all these social welfare
facilities was, however, not very successful in freeing
working women from their domestic chores. The mess halls
had serious problems in efficiency and management. Quality
of food prepared by the mess hall was bad, and workers did
not maintain a good standard of hygiene there. After two
years, the CCP abolished the mess halls but maintained the
other facilities (Andors, 1983, p. 51; Wolf, 1985, p. 22).
Although most of the domestic chores in the household
remained on the shoulders of older women and working women,
the establishment of these welfare facilities challenged the
idea that housework was primarily women's job. The CCP had
proven that alternatives were available, and women did not
have to be confined to their domestic sphere.
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Unequal Remuneration between Women and Men
Although women did the same type of jobs as men and
performed better than men, the remuneration to female
laborers, in most cases, was lower than that to male
laborers. Laborers in communes were rewarded by workpoints.
The workpoint method was a complex remuneration system, and
each individual commune had its own way of accounting the
contributions of workers in production. In general, a male
worker would be able to earn ten workpoints per work day,
whereas a female worker who do the same amount of work could
only make six (Wolf, 1985, p. 102).
It is important to understand that, under the commune
system, workpoints represented the social status of workers
rather than material rewards for their labor (Chan, et al.,
1984, p. 92). Because the team would provide the daily food
staple to peasants and would not distribute cash income to
households until the end of the year, workpoints would not
have any immediate significance for the survival of the
family. Instead earning high workpoints meant that she or
he was a good worker, and bad workers would be penalized by
being rewarding lower workpoints. Because males believed
that females were less productive workers, they would have
to maintain the gap of remuneration between genders so as to
protect their chauvinism in the rural communities.
- 23 -
Women's Resistance
Instead of being silent to the unequal pay situation,
women workers sometimes confronted their team leaders on the
issue in a meeting held by the commune leader. Women
workers who were brave enough would raise the issues in the
meeting, but the situation rarely changed (Wolf, 1985, p.
102).
The conversation between some woman cadres and Wolf in
her interviews in China probably represents very well the
situation in the few existing communes in today's rural
China; one of the women cadres said when asked about the
unequal pay issue (Wolf, 1985, p. 101):
The decision [on workpoints] has been made [by the team
leader] and there is nothing to be done about it. That
accountant that you [Wolf] met yesterday works very
hard and puts in long hours. All agree, even men, that
she should be paid more, but because she is a woman; it
is impossible. Last year someone from the county
Women's Federation came out here and argued for half a
day that women's workpoints had to be raised. We did
it, but as soon as she was gone, men expressed their
anger, and [the team leader] changed it back.
The State, Team Leadership, and Male Workers
This conversation portrayed a very interesting power
relationship among the State, the team leadership, and male
workers. On the one hand, the state exerted pressure upon
the team and brigade leaders to change the remuneration
system in their jurisdictions; on the another hand, if the
team leader raised the workpoints for women workers, it
would challenge males' alleged superiority and threaten
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their bargaining position against women in society. If the
team leader did not act in favor of male workers, male
workers might withhold their labor. The team leader,
therefore, is caught between the State and male workers
(Chen, et al., 1984, p. 71). Because the collectivization
of the agricultural production required local cooperation,
going against the common ideology in the male-dominated
rural communities would threaten the success of the State's
development policy. When the increase in agricultural
production was the first priority among all government
development policies, the consequence of not being able to
submit the production quota to the State would be far more
significant than not carrying out the order from the Women's
Federation. Team leaders (usually males), therefore, would
not risk their positions for the sake of equal pay for woman
workers.
Although female workers suffered from the unequal
treatment of the production teams and brigades, they only
voiced their discontent occasionally and seldom took action
such as a strike or formal protest. There were two major
deterrents that stopped women from taking a more active role
in the struggle against unequal pay in communes.
First, in the commune, women had very little economic
independence even though they worked as wage laborers in the
fields. The workpoints that workers earned usually
accumulate through the year, and the collective would
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distribute cash based on all workpoints that household
members earned to heads of households, usually the senior
male workers (Chen, et al., 1984, p. 91). In essence, women
and other junior members in the household did not have
direct control of the income that they earned from
collectives, and their livelihoods relied on their
corporation with the male heads of households. The alliance
that formed between the collective and the male heads of
households became a way to discipline female laborers (or
even junior male workers) (Davin, 1976). This alliance
ensured the subordinated position of female peasants in the
household and a disciplined labor resource in the rural
sectors of China.
Second, the extreme conservatism of the CCP to
alleviate gender inequality played a role in hindering the
rebellion of women against the unequal treatment within the
commune. When the tension on issues of gender inequality in
society intensified, either on the subject of equal pay or
social status, the CCP began to worry that the social
instability might affect the economic and political
development of the country. In order to avoid political
disaffection, the CCP would change their slogan from
promoting women's emancipation to encouraging women to
become good socialists. To be good socialists, as the CCP
put, female workers had to leave women's "special problems"
aside and concentrate on class struggles in order to
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construct a socialist China (Andors, 1983, p. 72). This, in
turn, put first priority on economic development and social
reforms over women's issues and undermined the importance of
gender equality in Chinese society. Woman activists who
continued to fight for women's liberation would be labelled
as nonsocialists because their actions might hinder the
stability of society. Being a nonsocialist in China is
morally unacceptable and politically dangerous.
Summary
Unprecedented in China's history, women for the first
time challenged the male-dominated society during the 1950s.
Although the struggle did not lead Chinese women very far
towards emancipation, it showed that women could act
collectively if they did not isolate themselves in
individual households. On the other hand, the experience of
women's struggle under the commune system demonstrated that
the male power was not confined to the household, but
expanded to production teams, communes, and even the State;
therefore, to understand the power relations between genders
and their bargaining positions in the rural communities, we
should look within and beyond the household.
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Chapter 3
WOMEN IN THE NEW PEASANT HOUSEHOLD ECONOMY
The new economic reforms have affected the way in
which peasants structure their lives. The government has
delegated the decisionmaking power on agricultural
production to the peasant household, and the peasant
household becomes a self-contained unit of production with a
high degree of autonomy in resource allocation and labor
mobilization.
In order to understand how reforms are working, we
have to understand first the way peasant households mobilize
their family laborers. We gather information from case
studies about the operations of 25 specialized households in
various regions of China (Nongye Chubenshui, 1984). Based
on this information, we will show how female laborers in
these households are mobilized, and we will also show that
the work burden on female laborers may have increased in the
new peasant household economy. Before we start with the
discussion of how female laborers are mobilized in the new
production system, we first describe briefly some of the
important features of the new peasant household economy that
are relevant to our study. Besides, we provide a more
detailed description of the new economy in Appendix B.
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Peasant Household Economy
After the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Congress of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in December 1978, the CCP has
reformulated its rural development policy. There are two
main features of the policy that affect directly the
organization of work and mobilization of labor in the new
rural economy: (1) the establishment of the "production
responsibility system" and (2) the promotion of domestic
sidelines. The main goal of the production responsibility
system is to link reward directly to performance. The CCP
dismantled the commune gradually and reinstated the peasant
household as a unit of production. The CCP believe that the
decentralization of production can simplify the accounting
system and allows remuneration to be tied closer to the
level of agricultural output of the peasant household
(Croll, 1988, p. 78).
Under the new system, the peasant household enters
into production contracts with the collective. In the
contract, the collective and the peasant household agree
upon the type of crops that the peasant household cultivates
and the quota that the household has to submit to the
collective. The peasant household can retain any surplus
over the quota for its own use, or sell products to the
market or the State at above-quota prices. This contract
system is referred to as "household contract system." Under
the household contract system, the peasant household regains
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full autonomy on the decision of organization of work,
allocation of family laborers, and distribution of labor
products within the household (Kelkar, 1985, p. 39). In
other words, female laborers in the household are once again
under the control of the male head of household.
In addition to the structural reforms of production
units, the CCP also promotes the diversification of
agricultural production in the rural areas. During the
current rural reforms, the government encourages peasant
households to expand their sideline production. Under the
commune system, activities in sidelines were kept at minimal
level; and the production of sidelines acted only as
nonstaple food supplies, such as vegetables and poultry, for
peasants. When the government reversed its policy, sideline
production expanded and became the major source of income
for some households in the current rural economy. Female
laborers who have the skills in sideline production become
major laborers in household production (Croll, 1987, p. 482;
Kelkar, 1985, p. 42). The increased involvement of female
laborers in household production and the change of power
structure in the rural community create a new way in which
female laborers are mobilized and controlled in the new
peasant household economy.
Mobilization of Female labor
According to an editorial in Women in China (1982),
peasant women can now control the arrangement of their daily
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production and enjoy the flexibility of allocating their
time between housework and farm work in the new peasant
household economy. The editor argues that when peasant
households become units of production, female peasants can
work in the fields during the busy season and turn their
attention to housework during the off season. The editor
argues that the work schedule is not as busy as under the
commune system. Under the commune system, female laborers
had to be present in the fields regardless of the amount of
work available, and this took away valuable time from female
laborers. Indeed, as the editor states, the commune system
was unable to utilize fully the female labor-power and
created a large amount of surplus labor in collectives.
According to the data from 25 specialized households
that we tabulated, 10 of the 25 specialized households (40
percent) have allocated women laborers to domestic
sidelines. (See Appendix C.) The primary agricultural
activity in these 10 specialized households is the
production of grain that mostly involves field work. Men in
these households are responsible for the work on the fields,
and women take care of all the housework and domestic
livestock. Only during the busy season and harvest time do
women and children have to work in the fields.
To a certain extent, the information seems to support
the argument that women have greater flexibility in
allocating their labor. In the 10 specialized households,
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women laborers concentrate on housework and sidelines during
the off season and provide additional help to men during
harvest time. We, however, argue that this information
remains inconclusive on whether work burden on women is
lessened or intensified in the household production system.
To resolve this question, we will have to compare the number
of hours that female laborers work under the commune system
with the number of hours they work under the household
responsibility system. Unfortunately, this kind of study is
not available in existing literature. We are, however, able
to gather some information about the allocation of labor
hours between genders within specialized households under
the current system. Although with this information we are
unable to verify whether female laborers have to work longer
or shorter hours in the new peasant household economy, we
can shed some light on the number of labor hours that women
and men contribute to household production in specialized
households.
Allocation of Labor Time in Specialized Households
Wang, Yang, and Kang (1985) have studied the
distribution of labor of peasant households in Hebei
province. In their study, they analyze how household
members in a typical specialized household in Hebei province
arrange their time during the busy season, off season, and
middle season in the new peasant household economy, and we
illustrate their findings in Tables 1 and 2. In these
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Table 1. ALLOCATION OF MALE LABOR HOURS IN A
TYPICAL SPECIALIZED HOUSEHOLD
Allocation Busy Off-busy Middle















































Source: Wang Hui King, Yang Kang Shan, and Kang Bei
Chun. 1985. "Structures of Social Distribution
of Labor Hour and Common Problems of Households
As Production Units." NonyCheun, Jingii,
Shehui (Rural Sectors, Economics, and Society),
edited by Research Institute of Agricultural
Development Problems. Beijing: Zhi Shi
Chubenshui (Knowledge Press). Vol 3, pp. 223-
239.
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Table 2. ALLOCATION OF FEMALE LABOR HOURS IN A
TYPICAL SPECIALIZED HOUSEHOLD
Allocation Busy Off-busy Middle













































Source: Wang Hui King, Yang Kang Shan, and Kang Bei
Chun. 1985. "Structures of Social Distribution
of Labor Hour and Common Problems of Households
As Production Units." NonyCheun, Jingii, Shehui
(Rural Sectors, Economics, and Society), edited
by Research Institute of Agricultural
Development Problems. Beijing: Zhi Shi
Chubenshui (Knowledge Press). Vol 3,
pp. 223-239.
- 34 -
tables, we express the allocation of labor hours in terms of
the average hours spent on different tasks in a 24-hour work
day, and we show the allocation of time by seasons--busy
season, off season, and middle season.
We can see from Table 1 that a male laborer in a
typical specialized household works an average of 15.3 hours
a day in agricultural production during the busy season and
7.5 hours in the middle season. Compare these data with
those in Table 2 in which we show the allocation of female
labor hours: a female peasant spends the same amount of
time in agricultural production during the two seasons. The
only difference between the allocation of time between a
woman and a man is that a man spends on average 13.8 hours
in major agricultural production and only 1 hour in
sidelines. In contrast, a woman spends only 12.8 hours in
major agricultural production and 2 hours a day in
sidelines.
We can see from this analysis that a woman
participates actively and contributes the same amount of
time as a man in major agricultural production in the
household. This result matches with our finding from the
analysis of the 25 specialized households that women are not
confined in secondary income-generating agricultural
production, but they are becoming part of the major labor in
the key households' production.
Another distinction in the allocation of labor hours
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between genders in a typical specialized household is in the
number of hours allocated to domestic chores. From Tables 1
and 2, we can see a big difference in the amount of time
that a woman and a man spends doing housework. A man spends
about 1.5 hours on average in domestic chores in all three
seasons; but a woman spends on average 2.5 hours for
domestic chores during the busy season, 6 hours during the
off season, and 4 hours during the middle season. In other
words, during the busy season, when a woman and a man come
home from a 15-hour work day, a man will be able to rest;
however, a woman will have to take care of domestic chores.
The contrast is much clearer during the off season: while a
man can enjoy his leisure, a woman will have to catch up
with the domestic housework that she leaves behind during
the busy season. During the off season, a man has about 10
hours of leisure time and a women has only 5 hours--half of
a man's. If we add up the hours spent on production and
housework, a woman works 8 hours a day during the off
season, and a man will only have to work 4 hours a day.
Wang's study has shown that a woman contributes more
than a man in the production and reproduction of the
specialized household. Although both a woman and a man
contribute the same amount of time in income-generating
production, a woman plays a far more important role than the
man in household reproduction. In general, Wang's finding
coincides with other studies of peasant women in current
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rural China (Wolf, 1985; Robinson, 1985; Croll, 1988; Davin,
1988). Because men are unwilling to share the burden of
domestic chores with women, the increased demand for peasant
women's skills, such as production of livestock and
handcrafts, added to their roles on domestic chores puts an
additional work load on the shoulders of peasant women.
This coincides with another observation from the 25
specialized household in our sample that women are engaging
in the primary income-generating activities. These
activities, such as livestock tending, fish-farming, and
handicrafts production, were primarily performed by women
and have become the major sources of income for these
households. In our study, 18 out of 25 (75 percent)
specialized households engaged in activities ranging from
afforestation and livestock raising to brush manufacturing,
and women are the major laborers.
Although we find that women in the 25 specialized
households take a very active role in income-generating
production, the position of women in these households has
not been enhanced. In our sample, none of the men in these
specialized households share any responsibility for domestic
housework with women. In all cases, women take care of all
the domestic chores.
Summary
In essence, based on limited information, we can
speculate that the increase in the income of these
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specialized households is based on two factors. First, the
changing of the government policy on sideline production
certainly affects the source of income of these specialized
households. Under the rural reforms, the CCP has promoted
domestic sideline production and released the price controls
on some of the nonstaple agricultural products in the rural
commodity market. As the policy of the CCP changes, peasant
households begin to shift from grain production to sidelines
with ease because of the availability of skilled female
laborers in sideline production who can be mobilized without
incurring much costs. In China, as in most countries, there
is no monetary reward for domestic labor.
Second, the increase of specialized household's income
is, in part, due to the extraction of female surplus labor
in the new household economy. As households specialized in
sideline production, the demand for women labor has been
intensified. On the one hand, women have to fulfil their
duties as mothers and wives according to the conjugal
arrangement in the Chinese society. On the other hand,
women are engaging in income-generating production as the
major productive laborers in the household. Although the
income of specialized households has increased, household
members have to work much harder than before (Croll, 1987,
p. 482). Especially for female peasants, they have to face
the dual responsibilities in the household, and the word
"double day" has become a common term to describe the
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working conditions for female peasants in the new peasant
household economy (Robinson, 1985).
As studies on the agrarian change in the Cameroons
(Jones, 1986), mechanization of agriculture in Malaysia
(Hart, 1988), and asymmetrical exchange within households in
Mexico (Beneria and Roldan, 1987) have shown, poor peasant
women have confronted the exploitation of their labor-power
and, in turn, shaped the process of agrarian change in their
rural economy. These cases have shown that rights and
obligations that govern the female roles in the household
are not static but can be redefined by women according to
women's bargaining position in the conjugal dynamics.
In Chapter 2, we showed that women were able to act
collectively to fight against the unequal remuneration
system in collectives. This may be due partly to the
political and ideological conditions during the Great Leap
Forward when the CCP was committed to achieving gender
equality. The CCP encouraged peasant women to stand up
against any discrimination. Only after the economic
situation of the country worsened, the CCP revised its
stance on issues of gender inequality.
Under the new peasant household economy, the question
is then what the Chinese peasant women have done or can do
to deal with the new social arrangements that intensifies
the exploitation of their labor in the male-dominated rural
society, and what the new arrangements are that act as a
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means of control of the female labor-power. We are, to a
certain extent, able to document that peasant women are
carrying a heavy burden on both production and reproduction
in peasant households, but we have yet to determine whether
or not women will rebel against the exploitation of their
labor. The inaction of peasant women may be either because
they think that they have to sacrifice to keep harmony
within the household or that the inter-household competition
under the new production system has fostered a sense of
cohesiveness among household members. In the following
chapter, we will explore the possible reasons for how women




SOCIAL ARRANGEMENTS IN THE NEW PEASANT HOUSEHOLD ECONOMY
We will discuss some of the possible social
arrangements--rules, rights, and obligations--that are used
as means to control family labor and the bargaining process
between genders and generations within specialized
households. Based on limited information, we argue that
there are four possible means of males' control over female
laborers: (1) males' ability to control household income,
(2) different employment opportunities between household
members under the rural reforms, (3) limited property rights
for peasant women, and (4) the inaction of the Chinese
government and indifference of local cadres towards the
issues of gender inequality. These four possible means are
based upon some general information rather than related
specifically to the social arrangements within or beyond
specialized households. Although these means remain as
hypotheses, they will act as important clues to understand
the mechanisms by which household income and assets are
controlled in specialized households.
Control of Household Income
Under the collective system, household heads (usually
males) controlled the income earned by individual household
members. The production team leaders distributed income
directly to the household heads based on workpoints earned
by the household members through the year. Davin (1976)
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argues that the commune system worked to women's detriment.
Although women, as Davin argues, lack their financial
autonomy, their abilities to earn income give them a clear
value of their labor outside their homes.
In contrast, the distinct income contribution of each
member of the household disappears in the new production
responsibility system. Because households in rural China
usually do not keep a clear accounting of individual
contributions to production, rewards to female laborers in
the household will be very difficult to determine. In
China, domestic labor simply does not receive any payment
for their work from heads of households (Fei, 1986, p. 3;
Cohen, 1988). In this case, we argue that male heads of
households may take this advantage and treat women's work in
households as "just helping." In cases of the 25
specialized households in our sample, most of the male heads
of households describe themselves as the major income
earners in households and put themselves in the position of
controlling the income of the household production. (See
Appendix C.)
We argue that the strategy of men to control their
wives is to keep their wives uninformed of their household
income. In most cases, men are responsible for marketing
the household agricultural and/or nonagricultural products
in towns and cities, which is the major channel to convert
household production into cash income. In our study, men in
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most of the 25 specialized households are responsible for
the accounting, materials acquisition, and marketing of the
household production. (See Appendix C.) Because men
dominate this function in households, women will have no
knowledge of how much household production can be sold in
the market. Besides, they will have no idea of the amount
of income that their husbands kept for personal use instead
of distributing to common funds for households' consumption.
There are two reasons that peasant women cannot emerge
as decisionmakers or controllers of household income in
peasant households. First, men believe that they should
take care of the business outside households, and married
women should remain as caretakers inside their houses.
According to an old Chinese custom, males call their wives
"neiren", which means "inside person", and social contact of
married women was to be kept at minimal level (Wolf, 1985).
Although this custom has been criticized in contemporary
China, it is still socially unacceptable for married women
in rural China to go into towns and cities overnight for
business purposes. This custom, in turn, assists men in
controlling household income.
Second, women have fewer opportunities to receive
education. In China, once a daughter is married, she will
move into her husband's family bearing her husband's name.
She will no longer be the member of her natal family and
provide security to her parents. Besides, parents think
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that a woman will eventually become a housewife, and they
believe that education for a housewife is wasteful and
unnecessary. Parents in rural China will, therefore, be
more willing to send their sons to school than daughters.
In 1982, China had 335.6 million illiterates, and 70 percent
of them were women (Kelkar, 1985). This astonishing rate of
female illiterates, to a certain extent, indicates the
social and economic biases towards women that, in turn,
shape the attitude of male supremacy in Chinese society; and
the division of tasks within the household is, obviously,
not based on the different ability between women and men but
a socially and economically constructed discrimination
against women in rural China.
Unequal Employment Opportunity for Household Female Members
With the development of rural enterprises, employment
opportunities for young women as wage workers have been
enhanced. As the employment opportunities for young women
outside their homes increase, they are, to some extent, able
to break away from the patriarchal familism in rural China.
Wolf (1985, p. 94) visited the rural enterprises of two
brigades in Jiangsu province in 1981, and she found that
women (especially those who are unmarried) are increasingly
being employed by the light industries in the rural
industrial sector, as shown in Table 3. In the Tianzhuang
Brigade, 80 percent of workers employed in the Tailor shop
are women, and most of them are between 16 to 25 years old.
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Table 3. EMPLOYMENT IN RURAL ENTERPRISES IN TWO
BRIGADES IN JIANGSU BY JOB DESCRIPTION AND
GENDERS*
Job location Total Percent Percent
or description Employees Women Men
Tianzhuang Brigade
Machinery 250 1 99
Hotel and restaurant 30 33 67
Bike repair shop 6 0 100
Tractor driver 20 5 95
Tailor shop 10 80 20
Cloth shoe workshop 60 60 40
Construction 25 48 52
Total 401 19 81
Zhoujia Brigade
Oilcan and dustpan 130 30 70
factory
Shoe brush factory 20 30 70
Writing brush factory 14 71 29
Paper box factory 22 73 27
Noodle factory 3 67 33
Handbag factory 11 64 36
Total 200 40 60
Source: Wolf, Margery. 1985. Revolution Postponed:
Women in Contemporary China. California: Stanford
University Press. Pg. 94.
* Survey conducted in Jiangsu province in 1980-1981 by Wolf.
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Similarly, factories that manufacture writing brushes, paper
boxes, noodles, and handbags all have 60 percent or more
female employees.
Shin (1988) and Fei (1986), in their studies of the
rural development in Sunan, have found that more and more
young unmarried women are leaving the farm and working in
the rural enterprises. Shin studies the age and the gender
of workers employed by industries in Sunan. In her study,
26 percent of workers in rural industrial sectors are women
between the ages of 16 and 25, and 27 percent are between
the ages of 26 and 35. The percentage drops to seven
percent for women who are 36 to 45 years old (Shin, 1988, p.
13). Women who are in the age category of 36-45 are usually
married and already have children. The reasons for this
difference is that enterprises are unwilling to hire married
women because they will have to provide nurseries and
maternity leave for female married workers. They argue that
this will incur higher costs of production in factories
(Wolf, 1985). There is no evidence that this discriminatory
practice in employment is checked by the government;
employment in light industry that is perceived as suitable
for females is limited to young unmarried women.
Although rural enterprises will distribute wages of
the young female workers to their father or male heads of
households, female workers can retain their bonus. This
payment from enterprises accounts for almost 25 percent of
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the total wages earned by female workers in Sunan (Fei,
1986, p. 4). With money available under the discretion of
young women, they are becoming less economically dependent
on their households and are less afraid to challenge the
patriarchal authority.
Unlike the young women, the married women and older
women realize that their employment opportunities outside
their homes are limited. Shin (1988, p. 13) shows that
females between the ages of 36 to 45 engage mainly in
agricultural production in Sunan. Under the new peasant
household economy, agricultural activities are carried out
mostly in the form of household production, and domestic
labor does not receive direct payment from heads of
households. Because married and older women do not control
any income, they know that they will have to depend on the
present and future good will of their husbands and sons;
this, in turn, undermines their bargaining power against
male domination in the household.
Males' Control of Household Property
In a large household, property relationships still
involve traditional elements. Property of a household can
be divided into three categories--household property
(jiachan), husband-wife property, and women's property.
Household property includes all the household holdings
(farming equipments and house) and earnings of members, and
it accounts for the largest share of the total property of
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the entire household.
Because of the collectivization of all farm property
in the 1950s, land is no longer considered to be household
property. Peasants, however, are allowed to apply for land
as house sites (Zhaijidi) in the village. Only males who
are at least 18 years old are eligible (Cohen, 1988). A
male head of household usually requests the house site for
his son by demonstrating that their present living condition
is too crowded. If the village government approves the
request, the household will get the house site free.
Although the site does not belong to the household, the
household owns the right of using the land, and this right
usually continues to pass down from father to son.
Gifts and payments given to both the bride and groom
during their wedding become the mutual property of the
husband and wife; nevertheless, the husband usually
controls this property, and the woman has hardly any access
to it. The only property that a woman has full control of
is the money that is given just to the bride during her
wedding (tixi, or tixiqian), and the wealth that the bride
brings with her from her natal family (jiazhuang) (Cohen,
1988). After marriage, a woman can keep all this property
and money; however, this property rarely accounts for a
significant amount of money and cannot, therefore, help the
woman become economically independent in the household.
The inheritance of property continues to follow local
- 48 -
and traditional practices that daughters do not have rights
to inherit family estates. Although the Agrarian Reform Law
that the CCP established in the 1950s has reinstated the
property rights of women in China, local governments
continue to accept and tolerate the "customary practice" of
property inheritance in the locale. Under this system,
peasant women are excluded from the application for house
sites and the rights to inherit family property. Simply
put, there is no opportunity for women to own a piece of
property in current rural China.
Government Policy Towards Women's Issues
The way government officials implement the household
contract system also reinforces the perception that men
should be heads of households. The household head's
position is defined by seniority of the male members, and
the household head's name symbolizes the family as a whole.
In most cases, males represent the household to establish
contracts with the government. Some male cadres even
believe that women should not be in a position of making
decisions for their families, they feel uncomfortable in
dealing with women heads of households (Wolf, 1985). To
some of the collective accountants and cadres, a household
is a unit of accountancy, and the income of household is
simply the household property (jiachan) that is controlled
directly by the senior male in the household.
This attitude of cadres towards women has, in turn,
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legitimatized the dominating position of men in households.
From the analysis of the 25 specialized households in our
study, we find that, in most cases, men are the members in
households who contract production with the collectives.
Although men may not necessarily be the major productive
laborer in the household production, they have the
decisionmaking power in household budgeting and the division
of labor within households.
Even the All-China Democratic Women's Federation
(Women's Federation), the most recognized government body
that deals with women's issues, is not always on the side of
women. The Women's Federation was founded in 1949, and its
major function is to publicize and carry out the Party's
political directions and campaigns. Andors (1983, p. 30)
has criticized the Women's Federation that it has been
operated as a part of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and
it does not have the autonomy to represent the women's
viewpoint and interests. Although the Women's Federation is
responsible for enhancing female political consciousness and
participation, its strategies and policies are conditioned
by the CCP's objectives of economic and political
development. Changes in the CCP's policy on economic and
political policy will affect the ideological context in
which women's struggle for gender equality occurs.
With the changes of the CCP's policy toward economic
development in 1978, the Women's Federation has established
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a new approach to the women's question in China. In the
fourth National Women's Federation Congress, the spokeswoman
of the Federation, Kang Keqing, laid down the roles of
female workers in the coming economic reforms. She outlined
the CCP's attitudes and policies that shaped women's
position in China, and it defined the secondary and
supportive roles of women in the Chinese modernization. The
main theme of Kang's speech was that women's major
responsibility is in the reproduction sphere, and women
should concentrate their efforts on developing a network of
child care institutions, public canteens, and household
services located in the collective sector (Andors, 1983,
p. 152).
Although Kang's statement did not imply that women
should return home, her speech reinforced the service role
of women for domestic chores and child care in general. She
directed the attention of the women's movement to resolve
the problems related to class struggle instead of gender
inequality in the Chinese society (Lou, 1986). The
formulation of this strategy is in view of the economic and
political instability of the Chinese economy after the
Culture Revolution and the ouster of the Gang of Four in
1978. The leadership after all these turbulent years
stressed the united front policy, emphasizing unity for the
purpose of economic development. Unity in society required
harmonious family development.
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After the production responsibility system was fully
implemented in the past several years, the economic
condition has changed as the new production system has
created new levels of unemployment in the rural areas. Some
government officials, factory and enterprise management, and
scholars advocate that the return of women to the domestic
sphere will benefit society and families (Ma, 1989, p.68).
State and collective enterprise management argue that
employment of women commits enterprises to provide nurseries
and maternity leave for female workers, and this will incur
additional costs of production (Robinson, 1985, p. 36).
In the Fifth National Congress of Women, leaders of
the Women's Federation such as Kang Keqing (Kelkar, 1985, p.
45) and Lou (1986, p. 166) criticized strongly the idea that
women should return home and perform their household duties.
They believe that the idea of "female workers go home" will
lead to a retrenchment of women's struggle for equality in
Chinese society. Although they disapprove of the idea, they
do not resolve the basic conflict confronting females--how
can women fulfill the dualistic role of being good
mothers/wives and workers. This bifurcated view of women's
roles has led to intensification of the work burden on women
in China, and, more importantly, it reaffirms the
traditional view of women's roles in reproduction.
With its self-contradicting strategy, the Women's
Federation is unable to help women from being exploited in
- 52 -
the new economic settings. In the countryside, as the
central government reduces its authority over peasant
households, the influence of the Women's Federation in the
rural areas is also reduced; and its major role has been
concentrated on the implementation of the birth control
policies of the CCP (Kelkar, 1985). The issue of gender
inequality in the rural areas becomes the last item on its
agenda because of the contradictory goals between achieving
agricultural development and enhancing the welfare of
peasant women simultaneously in a male-dominated society.
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Chapter 5
SUMMARY AND FUTURE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The major question that we raise in this study is
whether the Chinese government can really evaluate the
current rural reforms based on the success of specialized
households. We propose that the "decomposition" of the
specialized household will help us to gain important
insights into how the reform is working and how it affects
the livelihood of peasants in the countryside of China in
general and the welfare of peasant women in particular. By
looking inside the specialized household, we will be able to
understand the organization of work, distribution of labor
products, and control of decisionmaking power within the
household. The understanding of these household production
operations will, in turn, help us to analyze how rural
reforms affect the livelihood of Chinese peasant women.
In order to achieve our objectives, we develop a
framework to analyze the power relations and bargaining
position between genders and generations within and beyond
these specialized households. Although we are unable to
carry out all tasks that we propose in this study, our
analytical framework helps us to raise important questions
and formulate hypotheses for further research. In the
following, we will first summarize some of the major points
and hypotheses that we have made in this study, and we will
then propose some future research questions.
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Changes in Gender Relations and Organization of Work
The shifting from the commune system to the
production responsibility system, as we have stated in
previous chapters, has changed the organization of work in
the rural areas. The exercise of direct control over female
laborers is at a different level in the rural community
between the two production systems. Under the commune
system, production team leaders had the authority to
allocate and reward female laborers. Production team
leaders assigned jobs to female workers and determined the
amount of workpoints that female workers earned in the
fields.
When the government implemented the production
responsibility system in 1978, the household once again
became a unit of production. The State began to lessen its
control over the household production, and the peasant
household regained its full autonomy in deciding on its
production and allocation of its family labor. Under this
system, the male head of household resumes his control over
female laborers within the household.
Based on some indirect information, we speculate that
this institutional change has led to the increase in the
work burden on female laborers. This may be due to the fact
that peasant women are playing more active roles in
household production because of their skills in sideline
production. When the government changes its agricultural
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policy, peasant households are encouraged to expand their
sideline production, and peasant women become major laborers
in this production. At the same time, peasant women have to
be responsible for the same amount of domestic chores, and
this, in turn, increases the workload for female laborers
within the household. This extraction of surplus labor from
female workers in specialized households may be one of the
major reasons for the success of specialized households in
the new peasant household economy. Although, we need to
conduct a more detailed time-study on the number of hours
that women and men work under the two different production
systems, the issue has been raised so many times in writings
of Western and Chinese scholars that it should not be
neglected in analyzing the current rural reforms in China.
If female laborers are being exploited in the new
peasant household economy, we will have to find out how
female laborers are mobilized and controlled. We have
proposed four possible means. Although these means are
inferred from existing literature and need more empirical
evidence to verify their validity, they provide important
clues for us to investigate gender relations in future field
research.
First, we suggest that the reason why female laborers
can be mobilized and controlled is because males are able to
control the household income. According to case studies of
specialized households that we gather from existing
- 56 -
literature, we find that men in these households are
responsible mainly for the accounting and marketing of the
household production and establishing contracts with the
State. This will, in turn, give men the opportunity to have
more contact with the rural communities outside households
and have full control of household income. In contrast,
women who concentrate on manual labor in household
production will have no idea of the level of income that
their labor has generated. This division of labor inside
specialized households may constitute the different
bargaining position between genders in these households.
Second, even though the reform created new employment
opportunities in the rural areas, women and men of different
ages have different accessibility to these new
opportunities. This difference may affect the economic
independence of individual members and the bargaining
position between genders and generations within the
household. Based on the study of Shin (1988) in Sunan
County, young and middle-aged men are able to engage in some
nonagricultural activities such as construction,
transportation, and other services that allow them to earn
higher income. For young women, they are increasingly being
hired in the newly developed light industry in the rural
areas. With the increase in the employment opportunity for
young women, they are able to establish certain degrees of
economic independence in the household; and this, in turn,
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may lessen the males' control over their labor in the
household. In contrast, the employment opportunities for
married and older women outside their homes are very
limited, and their livelihood depends upon the household
income, which is under the control of male heads of
households. Their bargaining positions against the
patriarchal familism may, therefore, be weaker than the
younger generations.
Third, the Chinese rural society has denied the
property rights of females. Although the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) has established the Agrarian Reform Law that
reinstates the property rights of females, the allocation of
family property in the countryside of China remains the
same. Sons inherit all family property from their fathers,
and daughters are usually excluded. Because women do not
have control over any household property, and their
employment opportunity outside their households is limited
after they get married, their livelihood will depend on the
well-being of their husbands and sons. This will again
undermine their bargaining positions against male domination
within households.
Lastly, the Chinese government does not have a
consistent policy to deal with gender inequality in the
Chinese society. After the CCP had taken over China, the
State attempted to reform and redefine power relations
between genders and generations within households. These
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power relations, however, did not change because of the
resistance generated from the deeply rooted social attitude
towards women in rural China. As a result, social
structures that are, to some extent, defined by these power
relations remain the same in rural China. Because
development requires changes in social and political
structures, the rigidity of the social structures in the
countryside creates tension between political rhetoric and
economic policies of the CCP. To release this tension, the
government, in most cases, will concentrate on economic
development and put lower priority on the issues of gender
inequality. Without the full support from the Chinese
government, women subordination perpetuates. Accordingly,
females are unable to have full control over their labor.
Future Research Questions
We believe that all the above-mentioned issues will
remain important in all future analysis of rural reforms in
China. Besides, we raise additional questions in regards to
the current rural reforms. We think that there are four
important issues that deserve our attention in future
analysis. First, what is the main purpose for the Chinese
government to differentiate specialized households from
ordinary households? We suggest that the "creation" of
these specialized households may have important implications
on the governmental strategies for development in rural
China. The Chinese government officials may want to
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publicize the achievements of some households under the
current rural reforms, and this will enable them to proclaim
the success of current economic policy towards agricultural
development.
We think that one way to study the success of these
specialized households is to understand the intra-household
dynamics and power relations and personal connections
between these specialized households and the village
government. Besides, we should also try to investigate how
these power relations are defined and limited by the drastic
institutional changes under the current reforms.
Second, we need to study further the amount of work
burden on both women and men under different production
systems. We need more empirical data to document that the
workload for peasants, in general, and peasant women, in
particular, is heavier in the new peasant household economy
than under the commune system. Not only should we collect
the number of hours that peasants work, but we will have to
understand how peasants interpret the intensity of their
work before and after the new production system was
implemented. This information is critical for us to
evaluate how rural reforms change the structure of the
working lives of peasants and helps us to differentiate the
impacts of the rural reforms on the work burden of women and
men in the countryside of China.
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Third, we should also incorporate the relations
between classes, ages, and ethnic groups in the analysis of
the rural reforms. These elements are important to the
power relations within and beyond the household. Besides,
we should study not only these relations within households
or the village, but also we need to understand how these
relations connect to the larger social and political
structures in China.
In order to have a clearer picture of how the rural
reforms are working, we believe that we have to deal with
all the above-mentioned issues. These issues constitute the
web of relations between people, and they are subject to
constant changes because of interactions between people
within and beyond households under the changing political
and economic conditions in the rural economy. To study
these dialectical relations in the process of agrarian




In the new peasant household economy, government
officials have identified a specific type of households in
rural China. They call them "specialized households"
(Zhuanye hu). Such households develop out of an expansion
of the household sideline production with family laborers
concentrating on the production of cash crops farming,
livestock tending, afforestation, transportation, services,
and other nonagricultural production.
To be a specialized household, the household has to
apply to the county government for permission. Different
regions have different guidelines for qualifications to be a
specialized household. Besides, rights and priorities that
these households received differ between regions (Howard,
1988, p. 77). Unfortunately, there is no systematic study
on the regional difference of qualifications to be a
specialized household. According to a national guideline, a
household is qualified to be a specialized household if it
meets the following requirements: (1) 60 percent of the
household economic activities is in a single specialized
production, (2) 60 percent of the household labor force is
engaging in that production, (3) 60 percent of the household
products or services are sold for commodities, and (4) the
per capita household income from the sale of the specialized
production is twice as much as the nonspecialized household
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in the same region (Howard, 1988, p. 77; Municipal
Statistical Bureau of Shanghai, 1987, p. 432).
According to a report from the State Statistical
Bureau (1987), there were 3.7 million specialized households
in Chinese rural areas in 1986. Although the proportion of
specialized households in the total rural households remains
small (only 1.9 percent in 1986), the number of these
households is increasing rapidly. From 1985 to 1986, the
number of specialized households increased by 16.3 percent,
and approximately 2.7 percent of the total rural labor force
engaged in economic activities of these households.
The number of specialized households within any one
region is likely to be higher in the plains and coastal
areas where the average arable land per capita is high.
Although development has been uneven, the State Statistical
Bureau estimated that 53.6 percent of specialized households
were located in the densely populated and commercially
developed coastal provinces at the end of 1985 (Howard,
1988, p. 79).
The reason that specialized households received so
much attention from the Chinese scholars and planners is
their high productivity. For instance, in Guangdong, a
farmer contracted a 33 mu (15 mu is equal to 1 hectare)
fishing pool from a production team; within half a year,
the farmer turned the fishery business from an annual loss
into a profit of 4,500 yuan (Wei, 1983, p. 18).
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Some Chinese scholars such as Zhou (1985) and Wang
(1984) have argued that the success of these specialized
households is because of the household composition in terms
of their family sizes and the education level of household
members. Although these studies do not incorporate the
power relations in their analyses, they show some of the
familial structures of specialized households.
Composition of Specialized Households
Zhou (1985, p. 6) conducted a survey on the number of
family laborers in specialized households in eight different
counties in Sichuan province. Zhou states that household
size is positively correlated with the production level of
the household. The higher the number of laborers in the
household, the higher its production level. In his study,
Zhou finds that specialized households in his sample have a
larger number of family laborers than the nonspecialized
households, and he concludes that the success of specialized
households may, in part, be due to the availability of
family laborers in specialized households. We show Zhou's
result in Table 1A.
From Table 1A, we can see that 57 percent of the
specialized households in his sample have three or more
family laborers in their households. In contrast, only 24
percent of the nonspecialized households in Zhou's sample
have three or more family laborers (Zhou, 1985, p. 6).
Similarly, the sample of specialized households that we
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Table 1A. NUMBER OF FAMILY LABORER IN SPECIALIZED
HOUSEHOLDS AND NONSPECIALIZED HOUSEHOLDS IN
SICHUAN PROVINCE--1984
(Percent)
Number of family laborers
One Two Three Four Five Six
Specialized
householdsa 10 33 24 17 9 7
Nonspecialized
households' 30 46 14 7 2 1
a N=182
b N=1,861
Source: Zhou Tishun. 1985. "Analysis of the Family
Structure of Specialized Households: Survey of
Rural Household in Sichuan province." Research
in Social Science. 1985, No. 1. p. 6.
selected in our study have, on average, five family laborers
in these households, and this coincides with Zhou's finding.
(See Appendix C.)
Zhou's finding certainly makes a lot of sense in
contemporary rural China where labor is still the major
agricultural input in production. Because the idea of hired
labor is contradictory to the ideology of classless society
in socialist China, the major supply of labor in household
production relies on members of the household.
Another interesting finding of Zhou is that more
generations live together in specialized households than
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Table 2A. COMPOSITION OF SPECIALIZED HOUSEHOLDS




One Two Three Four
Specialized
households" 3 61 34 2
Nonspecialized
householdsb 8 69 22 1
a N=182
N=1,861
Source: See Table 1A.
nonspecialized households. With a larger household size
than nonspecialized households, specialized households have
a more complex household composition than other households,
and the level of complexity will also affect the gender and
generation relations in a specialized household. In a
"grand" household where several generations are living
together, the position of women will not only be determined
by gender relations but household hierarchy that is based on
seniority in the household.
In his sample, Zhou finds that the percentage of
specialized households that have three generations living
together is much higher than the nonspecialized households.
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In Table 2A, we can see that 34 percent of the specialized
households in Zhou's sample are composed of three
generations, whereas 22 percent of the nonspecialized
households have three generations living together.
Fei Xiaotong (1986), a Chinese anthropologist, has
studied the changes of family composition under the current
rural reforms. He argues that economic consideration is the
major factor that leads to the increase in the number of
generations living together in a single household unit (Fei,
1986, p. 3). After the implementation of the production
responsibility system, the household became a production and
consumption unit. Consolidation of family labor is required
for the development of the family enterprises; therefore,
even though, as Fei argues, a family with several
generations living together may mean a higher chance for
family conflict, members are unwilling to divide their
family (fenjia).
Educational Level
Many Chinese scholars and officials, such as Wei
(1983), Wang (1984), and Wan (1984), believe that the
success of specialized households is mainly because of their
special skills in agricultural and nonagricultural
production, and their specialties are due to the ability of
their household members to read and study scientific
techniques of production. In the same survey, Zhou also
analyzes the educational level of specialized households in
- 67
Table 3A. EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF MEMBERS OF SPECIALIZED
HOUSEHOLDS AND NONSPECIALIZED HOUSEHOLDS IN
SICHUAN PROVINCE--1984
(Percent)
Elementary Junior High Vocational Univer-
& illiterate high school education sity
Specialized
householdsa 16 56 24 2 2
Nonspecialized
householdsb 44 43 12 1 0
a N=182
b N=1,855
Source: See Table 1A
Sichuan. In Table 3A, we illustrate his results and show
the educational level of specialized households in
comparison to nonspecialized households. We can see from
Table 3A that the specialized households in the survey have
a much higher educational level than nonspecialized
households. Two percent of the 182 specialized households'
members received a college degree, whereas none of the 1,855
nonspecialized households' members went to college. Twenty-
four percent of the members of specialized household
received high school education, and only 12 percent for
nonspecialized households. In contrast, 44 percent of the
members in nonspecialized households are either illiterate
or only have a elementary education, while the percentage
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for the specialized households in the survey is much lower.
In his study, Zhou also finds that 90 percent of the
specialized households in the survey have members who





The process by which peasant households have become
the major unit of production is the reverse of the
collectivization of all means of production in the 1950s.
Under the collective system, responsibility for production,
accounting, planning, and distribution of production shifted
to communes, and the government reduced the property base
and the production responsibility of individual households
(Zhou and Du, 1986).
Despite the encapsulation of the individual household
by the collective, peasant households remained as subsidiary
production units under the commune system (Wei, 1983).
Farmers continued to carry out sideline production, such as
vegetable cultivation and domestic livestock raising, on
their private plots of farmland that were allocated to them
by the CCP; however, the nature of the agricultural
activities was mainly subsistence, and the CCP kept the
level of such activities at a minimal level (Croll, 1987).
After the death of Mao Zedong, the new leadership
initiated a number of rural economic reforms. The objective
of the reforms was to increase rural production, improve the
management of the rural economy, diversify agricultural
activities, furnish incentives to raise productivity, and
increase peasants' income (Wan, 1984, Pg. 16). To achieve
these objectives, the government gradually dismantled the
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commune system and contracted land and production quotas to
peasant households. This new form of production and
management system is called the "production responsibility
system" (Kelkar, 1985, p. 39).
The major goal of the production responsibility system
is to reduce the size of the collective and labor group in
order to implement a remuneration system that links reward
more directly to performance. The Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) believes that the major factor that constituted the
failure of the commune system was the mentality of
"everybody eating in the same iron rice bowl," and this
referred to the situation that workers received the same
rewards regardless of their efforts in production (Howard,
1988). The CCP argues that, under this circumstance,
farmers had no incentives to increase their productivity;
therefore, low productivity hindered the development of
agriculture in rural China (Zhang, et al, 1983).
When the CCP first implemented the production
responsibility system in 1978, the Party did not expect that
the new system would increase the autonomy of the peasant
household. In contrast, the collective was to remain as the
overall production unit and maintain its control on
planning, management, and accountancy in all contracts.
Besides, the CCP anticipated a gradual implementation of the
production responsibility system only to selected areas
(Croll, 1988).
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The reform, however, turned into an almost total
replacement of collectives with household units. At the end
of 1983, 98 percent of the land belonging to China's
production teams had been contracted out to peasant
households (Wang, 1984, Pg. 41). The production
responsibility system in one form or another is now
prevalent in almost all of China including the richer
2suburban communes.
Household Contract System
Under the production responsibility system, production
teams in collectives enter into contracts with small labor
groups and individual households, imposing a set of rights,
obligations, and responsibilities for production on both
parties. There are a great variety of contracting
arrangements. For instance, the production team may assign
responsibility to the individual household ranging from
individual tasks to the entire production process based upon
allocation of lands, with payment negotiated according to
the demand of the labor process or according to output3
2 Very few western analysts are investigating the reason
for this dramatic shift. Scholars and planners in China
believe that this dramatic shift resulted from the motivation
of farmers to increase their income. They also argue that the
emergence of the peasant household as the major production
unit is a logical step toward modernization of agriculture in
China.
3 The household contract system encompasses a wide
variety of forms. A detailed discussion of all these
arrangements is beyond the scope of our study.
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(Kelkar, 1985, p. 39).
The most common form of the contract system is that
the collective in the village contracts out land and output
quotas to each household, and it is referred to by its
Chinese term "bao gan dao hu" (Croll, 1987, p. 471; Tang,
1983, p. 42). The peasant household will receive land,
draught animals, and small- and medium-sized equipment for
its production. The collective will allocate land to the
household on a per laborer basis. Households do not own the
land, but they can cultivate the land for a period of 15
years; and the land is called the "responsibility land"
(Croll, 1988, p. 78). All field management from sowing to
harvesting and all costs of production including hiring
labor and small machineries are the responsibility of the
household.
The household contracts to grow specific crops and
provide a portion of the harvest to the collective. The
household can retain any surplus over the quota for its own
use, or sell the surplus to the market or the State at above
quota prices (Kelkar, 1985). The CCP believes that the
opportunity to earn additional income from selling the
production surplus in the market or to the state will induce
farmers to increase their productivity.
The development of the production responsibility
system as a whole, and the household contract system in
particular, has laid the groundwork for the first stage of
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the development of specialized households. The household
contract system establishes households as production units
with a high degree of autonomy. Combining this change with
the promotion of domestic sideline production has finally
led to the full development of specialized households.
Domestic Sideline Production
Policy formulated at the time of the commune system in
1958 clearly imposed limited rights of peasant households to
undertake sideline activities in their private plots.
Indeed, peasant households depended on their domestic
production to provide the majority of their nonstaple food
supplies, such as vegetables and poultry. Despite the
importance of sideline production to peasant households, the
CCP perceived this domestic production to be a contradiction
to the communal spirit and attempted several times to limit
sideline production (Andors, 1983).
Under the current rural reforms, the CCP has
encouraged the diversification of the rural economy. The
major goal for the diversification is to create income-
generating activities for the surplus labor that becomes
much more explicit in the new production responsibility
system. The new production responsibility system has
revised the old rewarding system by linking rewards with
outputs. This revision has led to more efficient use of
labor in the fields; therefore, the demand for labor
declined significantly, creating a large amount of surplus
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labor (Croll, 1988, p. 80).
Creating employment opportunities for unemployed labor
is an important and urgent problem. Collectives with
surplus labor have, therefore, encouraged peasant households
to allocate more and more of their time to domestic sideline
production. Consequently, the expansion of the sideline
production has broadened the scope of income-generating
activities for peasants (Croll, 1987, p. 472). In the late
1970s, the CCP not only legitimized sideline production, but
it also actively encouraged peasant households to engage in
this production. After the formal approval and
encouragement of the sideline production, it expanded
immediately.
Croll (1988, p. 80) provides three reasons for the
extensive increase in sideline production: (1) the peasant
household can provide the labor and simple equipment for the
sideline production without incurring large overhead costs,
(2) the sideline production can provide peasants with
greater supplies of food and consumer goods for subsistence
and exchange, and (3) this production can also provide rural
industries with raw materials.
In order to provide additional outlets for sideline
products and to encourage peasant households to produce a
wide variety of goods, the government has reestablished the
rural markets and fairs at which peasants can sell and
exchange goods, foods, and handicrafts at a negotiated and
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agreed upon price according to local supply and demand.
With the opening up of the rural market, the
government begins to encourage diversification and
specialization of agriculture. Diversification means
broadening the narrow emphasis on grain production and
develop cash cropping, afforestation, livestock husbandry,
and other nonagricultural production in the rural sectors.
The CCP has revised its former slogan of "taking grain as
the key link" in favor of "the all-round development of
agriculture" (Croll, 1988, p. 81).
Specialization means that regions should utilize their
resources and develop agricultural activities that are most
suitable for their rural economy. A region such as the
Yangtze River Delta that is better suited to produce cash
crops and fish should specialize in these products for both
intraregional and interregional markets. Similarly, within
the region, the village government has encouraged a degree
of specialization among peasant households. This
encouragement has become the major reason for the
development of specialized households.
Peasants who have specialties in producing certain
agricultural and nonagricultural products begin to
concentrate their labor in this production. For instance,
peasants who possess special know-how in livestock raising
will put all their household labor in production of
livestock products. They will then sell their output in the
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market in exchange for the daily subsistence crops for their
families. This increase in commodity exchange and division
of labor in the rural sectors has increased the level of
specialization in the countryside.
Appendix C Sanples of Specialized Households
Major Division of Labor Total
production ------------------------------------------------------ Annual
Head of of Number Man's Wonen's Incore
























5 1. Li's father takes care
of livestock and
fruit production
2. Li cultivates the
responsibility land








6 1. Xu's father does the
housework




Li's wife does the
housework
Li's daughter-in-law
takes care of livestocks





1. Xu's nother does the
housework







Hui Zengqui 31,031 Hebei
Major Division of Labor Total
production ------------------------------------------------------ Annual
Head of . of Nunber Han's Women's Income
household Sex household of labor job job Cyuan) Location
Zhan Tanglung hale Dairy product ' 1. Zhan engages in cattle 1. Zhan's wife engages in 15,000 Beijing
CMilk) rearing and cultivates
the responsibility land




















6 1. Yang is responsible
for aninal feed and
market the household
production
2. Yang's son cultivates
the responsibility land
3. Another son contracts
tea production fron
the collective
5 1. Ku is responsible for
naterials acquisition
for livestock
2. Ku's two sons engage
in cultivate pig feed
2 1. Zheng's husband is
responsible for duck feed
1 1. Gao's husband works
in the City of Guangzhou
6 1. Tian is a nanager and
technician in a communal
factory
2. Tian's son is
responsible for duck feed
3. Tian's father engages
1. Yang's wife is
responsible for pig
tending and housework




takes care of the
housework
1. Zheng tends ducks and
takes care of housework





Tian's wife focus on
duck feed production








Major Division of Labor Total
production ------------------------------------------------------ Annual
Head of of Number Man's Women's Income




















Chen engages in tea
production
Chen's father and brother
cultivate vegetables
1. Wang is in-charge of
the manufacturing of
brush
1. Xiong's wife does the
housework
1. Chen's wife and
brother-in-law take
care of the housework
2. Chen's nother and sister












I 1. Zhao and his sons
involve mainly in the
production of dairy
products
3 1. Ma cultivates pig feed
2. ha's father is
responsible for pig
tending
3 1. Ju concentrates on
bee rearing
3 1. Van and his son engage
in field work
1. Zhao's wife is
responsible for
housework
1. Ha's wife does the
housework
1. Ju's wife does the
housework and cultivates
the responsibility land











Major Division of Labor Total
production ------------------------------------------------------ Annual
Head of of Nunber Man's Women's Incone
household Sex household of labor job job Cyuan) Location
Wang Quixi ale Livestock 1 1. Wang and his son engage 1. Wang's wife does the N.A. Shanxi






















2 1. Pan is responsible for
fish breeding
6 1. Fan does field work
2.5 1. Zhao works on the
fields
7 1. Li works on the
fields
2.5 1. Su works on the
fields
5 1. Chen works on the
field
1. Pan's wife engages in
fish breeding and also
does all the housework
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